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Abstract
Interdiction is the deliberate act of attempting to destroy or damage a set
of components of an infrastructure system to degrade its overall performance.
A variety of mathematical interdiction models have been proposed in the liter-
ature to identify critical assets in supply systems. In this paper, we present an
interdiction model for median systems. In this model, the outcome of an attack
is uncertain, i.e. an attack is successful only with a given probability, and the
probability of success depends upon the amount of resources invested in the at-
tack. The objective is to allocate the interdiction resources among the system
facilities to maximize the expected disruption. We study three modeling alter-
natives for this problem. We present a computational comparison of the three
formulations, an analysis of the solutions obtained, and a study that identifies
those parameters that influence the time performance the most. We also test
the robustness of the models to different probability distributions. Finally, we
present results that demonstrate that the new model is more versatile than
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previously proposed interdiction models which do not consider probabilistic
attack outcomes and/or multiple offensive resources.
1 Introduction
Critical infrastructures are vital to the welfare of the society. The USA PATRIOT
Act1 defined critical infrastructures as "systems and assets, whether physical or vir-
tual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems
and assets would have a debilitating impact on the security, national economic secu-
rity, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. The terms
interdiction and attack are used interchangeably and are referred to as the deliberate
act of attempting to destroy or damage a set of components of an infrastructure sys-
tem to degrade its overall performance. An exhaustive survey of interdiction models
published before 2004 can be found in Church et al. [8]. The majority of these models
assume the existence of an interdictor who wants to degrade a system performance
the most using a limited amount of interdiction resources. Interdiction models can
be used to identify critical assets as well as estimate the worst-case scenario due to
disruption, be it intentional or not.
During the last five years, many other network interdiction models have been
proposed in the literature to capture more complex issues. Extensions to determin-
istic network interdiction models, include those by Khachiyan et al. [21], Bayrak and
Bailey [3], Royset and Wood [30], Lim and Smith [23], and Murray et al. [26]. The
stochastic interdiction literature is much more limited than its deterministic counter-
part. Some recent stochastic network interdiction models are those by Janjarassuk
and Linderoth [20], Hemmecke et al. [19], Held et al. [18] and Held and Woodruff [17].
On the front of applications of network interdiction models to real world problems,
some noteworthy studies are found in Salmeron et al. [32], Salmerón et al. [31] and
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Arroyo and Galiana [1].
Interdiction applied to facility location differs from network interdiction in that
arcs and their characteristics are not considered, and only facilities/nodes and their
services can be interdicted. To the best of the authors´ knowledge, the first in-
terdiction models for facility location date back to 2004 (Church et al. [8]). These
models, referred to as r-Interdiction Median Problem (RIM) and r-Interdiction Cov-
ering Problem (RIC), are built on the underlying p-median problem (Hakimi [16])
and the maximal covering problem (Church and ReVelle [9]), respectively. In both
models, interdiction is deterministic and complete. In RIM, the objective is to max-
imize the demand weighted distance between customers and the nearest working
facilities after the loss of r facilities. The RIC objective maximizes the decrease in
coverage due to the removal of r facilities. A probabilistic version of RIM, in which
the outcome of an attack is uncertain, is discussed in Church and Scaparra [11]. In
this model, called the Probabilistic Interdiction Median Problem (PIM), the attack
is successful with a given probability which is known to the interdictor but cannot be
controlled by him. The model proposed in this paper is a further extension of RIM
and PIM, in which the interdictor can, to a given extent, increase his probability of
success through the use of additional limited resources.
Interdiction models allow analysists and modelers to estimate the impact of
disruptions in supply systems. The logical next step is to develop strategies that
mitigate the consequences of disruptions and increase the system´s overall reliabil-
ity. This can be accomplished by devising a protection plan for an existing system
(fortification) or creating an inherently reliable system from scratch (design), where
both fortification and design models, commonly have an embedded interdiction
model. Fortification is concerned with the optimal investment of efforts to thwart
the attacker's best strategies. Church and Scaparra [7] showed that the most cost
effective allocation of protective resources does not necessarily involve the protection
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of all the facilities in the critical set, the set of sites an interdictor would attack in
the absence of any fortification. However, at least one site in the critical set must be
in the optimal fortification plan. Thus, the solution to a protection plan is neither
obvious nor easy to identify. Church and Scaparra [7] proposed the first fortification
model for facilities in a supply/service system, specifically for the p-median system
(Hakimi [16]). This model assumes sufficient resources to protect no more than q
facilities, which are declared out of the interdictor's reach and are always operational.
Two different solution approaches to solve this problem can be found in Scaparra and
Church [34] and Scaparra and Church [35]. Piyade et al. [28] present an extension to
this model that contemplates dynamic enlargement of the capacity of the facilities at
some pre-defined costs and considers nonuniform fortification costs instead of fixing
the number of protected facilities to a specific quantity. In a similar line, Scaparra
and Church [36] consider capacity restrictions on the system facilities and introduce
penalty costs that are incurred when the total customer demand is not met after a
disruption. Liberatore et al. [22] propose a fortification/interdiction uncapacitated
median problem where the number of attacks is uncertain.
Design models are used to identify the optimal location of a set of facilities by
taking into account not only the day-to-day operating expenses but also the costs as-
sociated with potential disruptions (Snyder and Daskin [37], Qi et al. [29]). O'Hanley
and Church [27] proposed a design model for the maximal coverage problem. This
model locates facilities to maximize both the initial demand coverage and the cov-
erage after the loss of r facilities. Bailey et al. [2] present a design problem with a
second-stage adversarial subproblem modeled as a Markov Decision Process.
In this paper, we extend the small collection of interdiction models for facility sup-
ply systems by introducing the Multiple Resource Probabilistic Interdiction Median
Problem (MRPIM). The model assumes that a supply system, where the demand of
each customer is entirely served by their closest facility, is vulnerable to malicious
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attacks. Attacks, if successful, render the interdicted facilities completely inoperable
and force the reassignment of the customers to further facilities, thus increasing the
overall operating costs of the system. In contrast with previous research, an attack
is successful with a given probability and this probability depends on the amount of
resources employed in the attack. In other words, we assume that the interdictor, by
distributing a limited amount of offensive resources among the facilities, can control
his probability of success and, consequently, the overall expected damage caused to
the system.
We study three modeling alternatives for MRPIM. Our initial formulation is a
non-linear formulation which includes a new form of closest assignment (CA) con-
straints. These constraints were devised to correctly compute the expected distances
between customers and facilities in the presence of probabilistic assignment vari-
ables, (See Gerrard and Church [14] for an in-depth discussion of other closest as-
signment constraints in location problems). We show how this formulation, called
MIP-MRPIM, can be linearized so that it can be solved directly by commercial MIP
optimizers. Unfortunately, due to the structure of the CA constraints, solving this
formulation requires a considerable amount of computing time even for small prob-
lem instances. We therefore propose an alternative bilevel model, BI-MRPIM, in
which the probabilistic assignments of customers to their closest non-interdicted fa-
cilities are enforced in the lower level problem. We show how this model can be
reduced to a single level model which is amenable to solution by MIP solvers. The
bi-level formulation significantly increases the scope and applicability of MRPIM to
larger problem instances. Finally, we provide a third formulation (NET-MRPIM)
in which the probabilities of assigning customers to their closest facilities, in accor-
dance with the interdictions made, are defined as flow variables on an appropriately
defined network. This network formulation is very effective and optimally solves all
the instances attempted in negligible computing time.
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The major contributions of this paper fall into two areas: first, it enhances the
interdiction modeling literature by introducing a more realistic model in which the
success of an attack is not certain and different amounts of offensive resources can
be used to disrupt the facilities. Second, from a modeling prospective, it intro-
duces the definition of new closest assignment constraints which can be employed
in combination with continuous assignment variables; the use of bilevel programs to
model complex constraint structures and a non-obvious network representation of a
probabilistic interdiction problem.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the problem and
present the first attempt at modeling MRPIM (MIP-MRPIM). In Section 3 and Sec-
tion 4, the BI-MRPIM and NET-MRPIM formulations are presented, respectively.
We test the performance of the three formulations and analyze the solutions obtained
in Section 5. Finally, we discuss some conclusions in Section 6.
2 Initial Model
2.1 Problem description, input data, assumptions
Our model assumes the existence of a p-median system composed of a set of customers
N (|N | = n), indexed by i, and a set of facilities F (|F | = p), indexed by j, where
hi is the level of demand of customer i, and dij is the shortest distance between each
customer-facility pair (i, j). As in most p-median problems, each customer is served
by its closest open facility (CA rule) since every facility is assumed to have unlimited
capacity.
Our objective is to maximally disrupt this system by interdiction where an attack
on a facility may be successful or not with a given probability. This probability can be
manipulated (increased or decreased) according to the amount of resources invested
in the attack. For simplicity, we use a set of discrete values that reflect the possible
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amounts of offensive resource invested on each facility and denominate them levels
of attack. Let K = {0, ..., kmax}, indexed by k, be the set of all the levels of attack
permitted and sorted in increasing order of attack intensity, and let cjk equal the cost
to attack site j at level k. We denote by pjk the working probability of a facility j
after an attack of level k , where pjk > pjk+1 and cjk < cjk+1, ∀j, k. For convenience,
we will define the lowest level k as no attack so that pj0 = 1 and cj0 = 0.
The objective of the attacker is to maximize the overall expected traveling dis-
tance for serving all customers by disrupting some facilities with a limited offensive
budget, r. To ensure service to all demand points even when all the facilities may be
disrupted, we use a dummy facility d that cannot be interdicted. Its working probabil-
ity is always one and there is a penalty did = gi for assigning a customer i to it. From
now onward, we denote by F¯ the set of facilities which includes the dummy facility as
well. Finally, to model the CA rule, we define the set Tij = {l ∈ F |dil ≤ dij, j 6= l},
for every customer-facility pair (i, j). Tij represents the set of facilities closer to i
than j.
Some of the assumptions made in modeling MRPIM are that the attacks on the
facilities are independent, and that the attacker has perfect information, e.g., attacks
success probabilities, about all the input parameters involved in the problem.
2.2 A MIP formulation (MIP-MRPIM)
In this section, we present a single-level formulation of MRPIM, which uses the
following two sets of binary variables:
yjk =






1 if customer i can receive service from facility j
0 otherwise
In addition, for each costumer i and each facility j, we define a continuous decision
variable zij, which represents the probability that customer i receives service from
facility j.










zij = 1 ∀i ∈ N (2)
∑
k∈K


























≤M(1− θij) ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ F¯ (6)
0 ≤ zij ≤ θij ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ F¯ (7)
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yjk = 0, 1 ∀j ∈ F, k ∈ K (8)
θij = 0, 1, ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ F¯ (9)
The objective function maximizes the expected weighted distance. Equation (2)
ensures that each customer is served with probability one, either by a unique facility
or through a combination of many, including the dummy facility. The fact that there
is a single level of attack to be executed over a particular facility is accounted for
by (3). Note that within the attack levels considered it is k = 0, representing that
if selected, no attack is accomplished and therefore pj0 = 1. Constraint (4) prevents
the overall cost of the attacks from exceeding the available budget. Constraints (5)
set upper bounds on the probabilities zij. Namely, they state that the probability
of assigning i to j is at most equal to the probability that i is not assigned to any
facility closer than j (1 −∑l∈Tij zil) multiplied by the probability that facility j is
working (
∑
k∈K pjkyjk). Note that the value of zij is strictly less than this upper
bound only if by setting it exactly equal to the upper bound, the total probability of
assigning i exceeds one. Constraints (6) and (7) force closest assignments. Without
these two set of constraints, the program would allocate customers to the farthest
facilities, regardless of the operational status of the closer ones. The idea behind the
CA constraints is the following: for any given customer i and facility j, we check
whether all the variables associated with facilities closer to i than j (zil, l ∈ Tij) take
on the maximum value given by equation (5). If they do, then θij can take value 1 to
indicate that customer i can be assigned to facility j with some positive probability
(zij ≥ 0). Otherwise, if there is a closer facility with some unused probability of
service, θij is forced to zero and, because of constraint (7), zij is forced to zero as
well. Note that a possible value for the big M used in these constraints is simply
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one. Finally, equations (8) and (9) state the domain of the binary decision variables.
Note that the variables zij and θij are defined also for the dummy facility, whereas
the interdiction variables yjk are only defined for the actual facilities.
A drawback of this model is the presence of the quadratic terms in the constraints
(5) and (6). These can be linearized with the following transformation. For each i,
j, l ∈ Tij and k, we define a variable vijlk ≥ 0. Then the product zilyjk is replaced
by vijlk, and the correct behavior of the newly defined variables is imposed by the
inclusion of two additional constraints:
vijlk ≤M1yjk ∀i, j, l ∈ Tij, k (10)
vijlk ≤ zil +M1(1− yjk) ∀i, j, l ∈ Tij, k (11)
In fact, when yjk is zero, then constraints (10) force vijlk to be zero as well. If
yjk equals one, then vijlk takes at most the value of zil (11). As we are dealing with
a maximization problem, vijlk takes the maximum value possible, i.e., zil. M1 is an
upper bound for the variables vijlk and a possible value for it is 1.














Here the right hand side of the inequality represents the probability that all the
facilities closer to i than j are not working and that facility j is working. However
these constraints have a higher degree of non-linearity and cannot be easily linearized
through a variable replacement.
10
Table 1: RIM vs. MIP-MRPIM: Size comparison
Ω RIM MIP-MRPIM
Cont. Vars np+ p n (p+ 1) + np (p− 1) |K|/2
Bin. Vars p p|K|+ n (p+ 1)
Constraints np+ n+ 1 3np+ n|K|p (p− 1) + p+ n+ 1
Table 2: RIM vs MIP-MRPIM: Size growth rate
∂Ω/∂p (∂Ω/∂n)
Ω RIM MIP-MRPIM RIM MIP-MRPIM
Cont. Vars n+ 1 n+ np|K| − (n|K|/2) p (p+ 1) + p (p− 1) |K|/2
Bin. Vars 1 |K|+ n 0 p+ 1
Constraints n 3n+ 2n|K|p− n|K|+ 1 p+ 1 3p+ |K|p (p− 1) + 1
2.3 RIM vs MIP-MRPIM
We now briefly analyze the increased difficulty of the model MRPIM as compared to
the deterministic model RIM (Church et al. [8]). Table 1 displays the size of the two
models for three categories (rows under the Ω heading), namely the total number
of continuous variables, binary variables and constraints. Table 2 shows the partial
derivatives of each element with respect to n and p for the two models. These values
express the rate at which each quantity of interest varies for a unit increase in the
number of customers and facilities, respectively. Besides having much more complex
CA constraints, it is evident that the size of MIP-MRPIM is considerably greater
than the size of RIM for each of the three categories. Moreover, the size of MIP-RIM
increases significantly faster as n and p increase.
Preliminary attempts at solving this formulation revealed that for many real
sized problems was not possible to prove the solution optimality within a few hours
of computing time. We believe that the slow convergence was mainly to be imputed
to the constraints (6) and (7). To overcome this difficulty, we propose a bi-level
formulation where the objective of the lower level problem enforces the CA rule.
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3 A Bi-level formulation (BI-MRPIM)
Multi-level formulations are hierarchical problems in which the objective function
and the set of feasible decisions made at one level are in part determined by deci-
sions made at other levels (Bracken and McGill [4]). Multi-level problems are very
common in the literature of interdiction and fortification where the programs have as
many levels as the number of agents with different objectives, e.g., systems planners
and defenders, attackers, system users and operators (Brown et al. [5], Cormican
et al. [12], Scaparra and Church [34], Cappanera and Scaparra [6]). Although con-
ceptually straightforward, bi-level problems are burdensome to solve, especially if
binary variables are present in the lower level problem (See Moore and Bard [24]
or Dempe [13] for an in-depth discussion of bi-level mixed-integer models). Even
bi-level problems with only continuous variables can become intractable as the prob-
lems grow in size (Lim and Smith [23]). Here, we propose a bi-level formulation for
MRPIM with binary interdiction variables that, after simple manipulations, can be
efficiently solved by all-purpose optimization software.










cjkyjk ≤ r (15)




















∀i ∈ N, j ∈ F (19)
zid ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N (20)
zij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀j ∈ F¯ (21)
Bi-level problems make use of the idea of two-player or leader-follower games
(Stackelberg [38]). Here, the upper level program, (13)-(16) plays the role of the
interdictor who leads the game by choosing which facilities to attack and at which
level (fixes yjk) in order to maximize the system disruption, which is evaluated in the
user problem. The lower level problem (17)-(21) defines the strategy of the follower or
system user. The objective minimizes the expected demand-weighted total distance
expressed in terms of the user variables only (zij), but the feasible region is defined
by the upper level interdiction variables. Note that the constraints involved in both
the upper and lower level programs are the same constraints that were in the single-
level formulation. For this reason, we omit any further explanation. Note that the
closest assignment constraints of MIP-MRPIM are not necessary as the objective
of the lower level problem will ensure this property in conjunction with constraints
(19).
To solve this problem it is necessary to transform it into a single level formulation
(see for example Wood [40]). For this purpose, we take the dual of the lower level
linear sub-problem in the zij variables.
Let αi, βij and γi be the dual variables associated with constraints (18), (19) and
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plkylk ≤ hidij ∀i ∈ N,∀j ∈ F (23)
αi − γi ≤ hidid ∀i ∈ N (24)
βij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀j ∈ F (25)
αi unrestricted ∀i ∈ N (26)
γi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (27)
Note that there are quadratic terms in both the objective function and constraints
(23). These quadratic terms are linearized as follows. Let vijk ≥ 0 be the product of
βijyjk; then, we insert into the model the linearization constraints displayed below:
vijk ≤Myjk, ∀i, ∀j,∀k (28)
vijk ≥ βij −M(1− yjk), ∀i, ∀j,∀k (29)
The use of constraints (28) and (29) ensures that if yjk = 0, then vijk = 0 for each
i; whereas if yjk = 1 then vijk = βij for each i. M is a valid upper limit of vijk. A
possible value for M is maxij (hidij).





















cjkyjk ≤ r (32)





plkvilk ≤ hidij ∀i ∈ N, ∀j ∈ F (33)
vijk ≤Myjk, ∀i ∈ N, ∀j ∈ F, ∀k ∈ K (34)
vijk ≥ βij −M(1− yjk), ∀i ∈ N, ∀j ∈ F, ∀k ∈ K (35)
αi − γi ≤ hidid ∀i ∈ N (36)
yjk ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ F, ∀k ∈ K (37)
βij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀j ∈ F (38)
αi unrestricted ∀i ∈ N (39)
γi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (40)
vijk ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀j ∈ F, ∀k ∈ K (41)
Although this formulation is more efficient than the previous one, it still ex-
periences some convergence difficulty, especially for large values of the interdictor
budget. We therefore provide a third formulation for MRPIM which proved to be
more scalable across larger parameter ranges.
4 A Network-like formulation (NET-MRPIM)
The second reformulation of MRPIM is based on a network representation of the
problem similar to the one used in Morton et al. [25] and Scaparra [33]. We assume
that each customer i performs a walk through a path including P + 1 nodes. Each
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node along the path corresponds to a facility (including the dummy facility) and
the nodes are sorted in increasing order of distance from i. Let ij represent the j
th
closest node to customer i. Node ij is connected to the next node ij+1 through kmax
arcs, but at most one of these arcs is enabled. Namely, an arc from ij to ij+1 at
level k is enabled only if the facility corresponding to node ij is interdicted with k
resources, where k ranges between 1 and kmax. Customer i visits each node along
the path until he reaches either a node ij with none of its outgoing arcs enabled (i.e.,
a node corresponding to a non-interdicted facility), or the terminal node in his path
(i.e., the node corresponding to the dummy facility).
In this formulation, the interdictor decides which arcs to enable (i.e., which facil-
ities to interdict and at which level), so that the overall demand-weighted distance
is maximized. Note that in this formulation, the decision variables yjk determine
whether an arc leaving node j at level k is enabled or not.
In order to capture the probability that each customer reaches a given node in
this model, we define the following additional variables.
δij : probability that customer i stops at facility j. This quantity is positive only
if facility j is not interdicted.
wijk: if facility j is interdicted at level k, this is the probability that customer i
reaches facility j. This is equivalent to the probability that all the facilities closer to
i than j are not working. If facility j is not attacked with k resources, this quantity
is zero.
xi: probability that customer i reaches the dummy facility.



















wijk ≤ yjk ∀i ∈ N, j = 1, ..., p, k = 1, ..., kmax (42)
∑
k





cjkyjk = r (44)
∑
k










(1− pipk)wiipk, ∀i ∈ N (47)
yjk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ N, k = 1, ..., kmax (48)
wijk ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, j = 1, ..., p, k = 1, ..., kmax (49)
xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N (50)
δij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, j = 1, ..., p (51)
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The objective function maximizes the sum of expected distances traveled by all
the customers. Constraints (42) state that if a facility j is not attacked with k
resources (yjk = 0), the probability that any customer i uses arc k to travel from
j to his next closest facility must be zero; else, the probability wijk is at most one.
The interdictor can only use one level of resources to interdict each facility (43) and
cannot exceed an overall budget of r resources (44). Constraints (45)-(47) can be
seen as flow balance constraints. For each customer i, constraints (45) force one
unit of flow out of the initial node in i's path. This unit can either flow to the next
closest facility if one of the outgoing arcs from node i1 is enabled (
∑
k wii1k = 1)
or stop at the first node (δi1 = 1), meaning that customer i's demand can be fully
served by his first closest facility. Constraints (45) enforce flow conservation at all
intermediate nodes along the path. More specifically, they state that the probability
that a customer i either stops at his jth closest facility (δiij > 0) or proceeds to the
next closest facility using one of the k arcs (
∑
wiijk > 0) is equal to the probability
that i arrives at ij, which in turn is the probability that i arrives at his j
th−1 closest
facility through some enabled arc k multiplied by the probability that facility ij is not
working, (1− pij−1k). Note that the maximization nature of the problem inherently
enforces the decisions of leaving or stopping at a given node j to be exclusive, i.e.,
if
∑
k wiijk > 0 then δiij = 0, else if δiij > 0, then
∑
wiijk = 0. Finally, constraints
(47) enforce the probability that each customer reaches the terminal node to be equal
to the probability that the customer leaves the former node, ip, multiplied by the
probability of finding that node inoperative. Constraints (48) through (51) define
the domain of the decision variables. Figure 1 displays a visual representation of the
NET-MRPIM formulation for a given customer i.
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Figure 1: Visual representation of the NET-MRPIM formulation
4.1 Remarks and Extensions
 The three formulations for MRPIM are a generalization of RIM and PIM. That
is, by setting K = {0, 1}, RIM and PIM can be obtained by choosing pj1 = 0
and pj1 = a respectively, where 0 < a < 1.
 In any of the presented three formulations, cardinality constraints or budget
constraints on the interdiction resources can be used interchangeably. Using
cardinality constraints is equivalent to assuming that each attack level corre-
sponds to the number of resource units used on a facility, each unit of resource
has a unit cost and r is the total number of resources available.
 The MRPIM model can be extended to tackle the case where the facilities can
be interdicted with different types of offensive resources (Wood [40]). Several
variations of this extension may be considered. These include: 1) models where
the resources are independent and only one type of resource can be used on a
given facility; 2) models where different types of resources can be employed to
interdict the same facility, and the probability of a successful attack depends
upon both the type and the amount of resources employed; 3) models where
at least one unit of each type of resource must be employed to have a positive
probability of success.
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5 Results and analysis
5.1 Test settings and Input parameters
The tests were conducted on an Intel Core 2 CPU 6700 @ 2.66 GHz, with 2 GB of
RAM. The formulations were implemented in C++ and compiled using Microsoft
Visual C++.NET 2003. Then, the optimizer was called from our source code. We
used CPLEX 9.1. Two data sets were used for the tests: the Swain data set with 55
nodes (Swain [39]), and the London Ontario data set with 150 nodes (Goodchild and
Noronha [15]). In our experiments, we chose kmax = 3 in order to have three levels
of attack: a high level, a medium level and a low level. Also, we used three different
probability functions to model the impact of the amount of offensive resources on
the working probability of a facility. Specifically, we assumed that for each facility
j, the probability pjk is equal to: 1) pjk = ((kmax − k)/kmax)φ (concave function);
2) pjk = 1 − k/(kmax + 0.5) (linear function); 3) pjk = φk (convex function). We
assumed that pj0 = 1 for each function, and set φ = 0.6. A discretized representation
of the three probability functions and the corresponding pjk values for each value of
k are displayed in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Convex, Linear and Concave Probability Functions
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Figure 3: Reduction of the working probability from level k − 1 to level k
Figure 3 displays the drop of the working probability after an attack at each
level k for the three different and non-dominated functions. The convex distribution
achieves a faster reduction of the working probability for low level attacks. The
concave function produces smaller reductions for low values of k, but for the largest
value k = 3 it reduces the working probability to zero (Figure 2).
In our initial testing, we use cardinality constraints where r ranges between 1 and
4, as in Church and Scaparra [10]. The number of facilities in the system, p, is equal
to 5, 10 and 15 for the Swain data set, and to 10, 20, 30, and 50 for the London data
set. Finally, in our algorithmic implementation, we set a time limit of 3 hours for
the branch and bound procedure and an optimality tolerance of 0.1%.
5.2 Analysis of Performance
5.2.1 Efficiency comparison of the three formulations
Table 3 displays the results for the Swain data set and the convex probability function
obtained with the three proposed models. Each problem in this data set was solved
to optimality by all the three formulations. The optimal objective function value
for each instance is displayed in the right most column. On average, MIP-MRPIM,
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BI-MRPIM and NET-MRPIM spent 2569.53, 15.49 and 0.4 seconds, respectively, to
find the optimal solutions. The network formulation is significantly faster than the
other two formulations.
These results were corroborated when solving larger instances. Table 4 displays
the results for the London data set and the convex probability function. The perfor-
mance of MIP-MRPIM and BI-MRPIM is clearly inferior on this set of instances, in
terms of both time and solution quality. MIP-MRPIM found the optimal solution for
only 17 out of the 40 instances and for 8 instances (denoted with an asterisk) could
not find a feasible solution within the 3 hours of computing time allowed. The aver-
age percentage distance from the optimal solution, displayed in the column GAP(%),
was 2.22, and the average time was 6714.3 seconds. The bilevel formulation produced
better results, by solving all but 2 instances to optimality, with an average gap of
only 0.06%. The computing times though were significant (almost 2500 seconds on
average). The NET-MRPIM is the fastest formulation and always reached the op-
timum with an average solution time of 5.6 seconds. The most difficult instance
(p = 30, k = 3, r = 4) was solved in only 38.86 seconds. Similar improvements from
one formulation to another were obtained with the other probability functions.
5.2.2 Insights on NET-MRPIM performance
Given the efficiency of the NET-MRPIM formulation, we put it to the test on the
London data set for larger values of the budget r, ranging from 1 up to 12. All the
instances tested were solved to optimality with an average computing time of 75.25
seconds and a worst-case time of 3802.95 seconds, obtained for the instance with the
concave probability function, p = 50, k = 3, and r = 10.
In the Tables 5, 6 and 7 we study the sensitivity of the computing effort to the
parameters r, p and k, and to the probability distributions. In each table, we report
the average time across different values of the other parameters while maintaining
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Table 3: Performance Comparison of MIP/BI/NET for Swain
TIME(s) OBJ.VALUE
p k r MIP BI NET
5 1 1 3284.88 0.67 0.02 3437.78
5 1 2 1887.89 0.5 0.05 3894.97
5 1 3 1791.15 0.42 0.05 4344.62
5 1 4 1611.19 0.36 0.03 4712.21
5 2 2 2063.83 0.67 0.09 3894.97
5 2 3 1645.31 1.11 0.2 4344.62
5 2 4 2017.37 1.25 0.27 4799.65
5 3 3 2107.86 1.2 0.34 4344.62
5 3 4 2208.87 1.48 0.55 4799.65
10 1 1 4.33 2.06 0.03 2065.05
10 1 2 24.73 2.92 0.03 2202.33
10 1 3 41.11 3.45 0.01 2339.54
10 1 4 20.2 3.03 0.03 2468.99
10 2 2 4960.63 3.59 0.19 2202.33
10 2 3 3603.45 6.78 0.36 2339.54
10 2 4 3052.9 11.47 0.8 2468.99
10 3 3 10800.74 7.69 0.8 2339.54
10 3 4 10800.76 15.78 1.63 2468.99
15 1 1 6.14 8.31 0.03 1473.88
15 1 2 44.55 16.05 0.03 1580.2
15 1 3 64.08 26.41 0.05 1675.16
15 1 4 64.02 30.85 0.03 1772.21
15 2 2 273.57 9.47 0.22 1580.2
15 2 3 1532.93 31.91 0.48 1675.16
15 2 4 708.76 65.69 0.75 1777.78
15 3 3 4493.3 34.86 1.38 1675.16
15 3 4 10262.8 130.26 2.48 1777.78
Average 2569.53 15.49 0.40
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Table 4: Comparison Performance MIP/BI/NET-MRPIM for London
TIME(s) OBJ.VALUE GAP(%)
p k r MIP BI NET MIP BI
10 1 1 19.31 19.23 0.09 201739.29 0.00 0.00
10 1 2 70.25 24.33 0.14 214437 0.00 0.00
10 1 3 91.49 27.34 0.14 228097.15 0.00 0.00
10 1 4 287.84 27.22 0.13 241318.44 0.00 0.00
10 2 2 9235.72 22.42 1.08 214437 0.00 0.00
10 2 3 5436.53 42.45 2.28 228097.15 0.00 0.00
10 2 4 6300.4 71.74 2.83 241318.44 0.00 0.00
10 3 3 10701.64 47.81 4.61 228097.15 0.00 0.00
10 3 4 10815.35 94.66 8.38 241318.44 0.00 0.00
20 1 1 156.16 15.49 0.09 130190.89 0.00 0.00
20 1 2 1293.6 498.47 0.11 137365.91 0.00 0.00
20 1 3 1548.6 1272.4 0.17 141875.34 0.00 0.00
20 1 4 2180.13 354.73 0.22 146333.56 0.00 0.00
20 2 2 8721.38 160.87 0.22 137365.12 0.00 0.00
20 2 3 10804.99 405.22 5.14 142062.98 0.00 0.00
20 2 4 10804.76 2444.78 5.49 146572.34 3.54 0.00
20 3 3 10805.36 949.34 11.17 142063.01 5.26 0.00
20 3 4 10806.37 3628.37 19.86 146572.56 5.24 0.00
30 1 1 710.74 55.61 0.16 93169.71 0.00 0.00
30 1 2 10808.65 158.43 0.14 97236.04 1.26 0.00
30 1 3 10807.17 647.99 0.17 100388.3 11.86 0.00
30 1 4 10807.62 2208.51 0.17 103490.37 14.51 0.00
30 2 2 10812.12 324.9 0.63 97235.49 3.82 0.00
30 2 3 10812.14 7129.07 3.13 100387.75 5.01 0.00
30 2 4 10812.14 6691.73 8.25 103522.06 5.89 0.00
30 3 3 10816.91 1354.55 17.63 100387.75 2.70 0.00
30 3 4 10815.73 8082.4 38.86 103522.18 2.97 0.00
50 1 1 716.35 62.85 0.25 53452.66 0.00 0.00
50 1 2 * 354.11 0.25 55636.11 * 0.00
50 1 3 * 5449.38 0.25 57569.56 * 0.00
50 1 4 * 10807.98 0.25 59423.29 * 0.00
50 2 2 * 721.98 1.38 55634.92 * 0.00
50 2 3 * 5632.72 5.78 57568.37 * 0.00
50 2 4 * 10813.38 8.13 59422.09 * 1.02
50 3 3 * 8007.06 19.16 57568.37 * 0.00
50 3 4 * 10801.96 34.78 59422.09 * 1.18
Average 6714.27 2483.65 5.60 2.22 0.06
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Table 5: Mean computing time for some fixed values of the parameter r
r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Time 6.87 4.9 9.02 19.02 27.09 35.11 76.63 73.52 103.89 204.79 169.26 162.91
Table 6: Mean computing time for some fixed values of the parameter p
p 10 20 30 40 50
Time 8.5 25.38 50.4 110.54 177.27
one of the parameters fixed.
Note that the largest variation in time is observed for the parameter k, when its
value increases from 2 to 3 (Table 7 (left)). As expected, increasing values of the
parameters r and p result in more difficult problems to solve. Finally, the instances
using a concave probability distribution seem to be more time-consuming than the
ones with linear and convex distributions.
5.3 Choosing the probability distribution
In this section, we analyze how the probability functions affect the number of re-
sources which are employed to hit each facility in the optimal solutions. We then
analyze the robustness of the solutions found to possible misestimations of the prob-
ability functions.
5.3.1 Analysis of the solutions obtained
Figures 4, 5 and 6 display the allocation of resources, averaged across different bud-
get amounts (r), for different values of the parameters k and p. The charts show











Figure 4: Distribution of resources for London and the concave function
that the probability functions have a big impact on the distribution of the offensive
resources among the facilities. In fact, for the concave, linear and convex distri-
butions, respectively, the attacker spends on average 82.6%, 79.6% and 3.3% of its
resources in attacks of level 3. This confirms a quite intuitive result. Namely, when
we use the concave function, which reduces to zero the working probability of a fa-
cility attacked at level 3, the attacker tends to concentrate his offensive resources
on a few key facilities to increase his chances of completely disabling them. On the
other side, when we use the convex probability function, where the marginal work-
ing probability decreases with increasing attack's levels, the attacks are more spread
out across the facilities and the majority of the facilities are attacked with only one
unit of offensive resources. The behavior of the linear function is similar to that of
the concave function, although less pronounced, especially in systems with a small
number of facilities (e.g., p = 10).
Tables 8 and 9 display the usage rate of each attack level k given a particular
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Figure 5: Distribution of resources for London and the linear function
Figure 6: Distribution of resources for London and the convex function
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Table 8: Expected usage of level k for London data set
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
Concave 0.044 0.115 0.993
Linear 0.058 0.168 0.922
Convex 0.608 0.413 0.037
Table 9: Expected usage of level k for Swain data set
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
Concave 0.061 0.201 0.981
Linear 0.190 0.450 0.819
Convex 0.480 0.523 0.028
probability distribution for the London and Swain data sets, respectively. The tables
display the average values obtained across a set of solutions with different combina-
tions of the parameters p and r. We calculate the usage rate of k for a given solution
as the total number of facilities hit at level k divided by the maximum number of
facilities that could have been attacked at k (maxk), e.g., for r = 5, max1 = 5,
max2 = 2, max3 = 1. Again, it can be noticed that the choice of the level of attack
is highly dependent on the probability distribution: for the concave distribution, the
usage rate of attacks at level 3 is 0.993, whereas for the convex distribution is only
0.037 (Table 8). Similar results hold for the Swain data set, shown in Table 9.
5.3.2 Robustness
Given the strong correlation between the probability functions used in the model
and the distribution of the offensive resources among the facilities, we now analyze
the robustness of the MRPIM optimal solutions to an uncertain type of probability
distribution. Tables 11 and 10 display the average regret and maximum regret (in
bold) of supposing a particular type of probability distribution that is not the one
actually occurring. At the bottom of the tables (underscored numbers), we observe
that on average the largest regret for the London data set amounts to 7.4% if a convex
probability function is assumed. For the Swain data set, the largest average regret
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Concave * 0.039/0.244 0.183/0.337
Linear 0.016/0.119 * 0.046/0.129
Convex 0.107/0.407 0.057/0.244 *
Expected 0.061 0.048 0.115






Concave * 0.005/0.043 0.112/0.304
Linear 0.002/0.026 * 0.036/0.118
Convex 0.041/0.095 0.036/0.082 *
Expected 0.022 0.020 0.074
is 11.5% and is also obtained when we assume a convex probability function. The
safest choice is to assume a linear distribution of the working probabilities. For this
distribution, the average regrets are 2.0% for London and 4.8% for Swain, while the
maximum regrets are 8.2% and 24.4% respectively. The concave or convex functions
can produce an error of up to 40% and 33.7% on the Swain data set. Finally, we
observe that the instances solved for the larger data set (London) are generally less
sensitive to misestimations of the probability distribution.
5.4 MRPIM Justification
In this subsection, we analyze the benefits of allowing the usage of multiple resources
to attack a facility in a median interdiction problem. To this end, we compare the
solutions obtained with MRPIM with the ones obtained with RIM and PIM.
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5.4.1 MRPIM versus RIM
One of the basic assumptions of RIM is that an attack on a facility is always success-
ful and entails a cost of one unit. To compare MRPIM and RIM, we changed the
probability distributions so that an attack at the highest level guarantees the destruc-
tion of the facility, i.e., for k = kmax = 3, pj3 = 0 for each probability function. For
each facility j, the modified probability functions, shown in Figure 7, are as follows:
1) pjk = (kmax − k/kmax)0.6 (concave function), pjk = 1 − (k/3) (linear function);
pjk = (kmax − k) /
(
kmax (k + 1)
0.7) (convex function), ∀k = 0, 1, 2, 3. Then, an at-
tack of level three in MRPIM generates the same disruption as an attack in RIM.
However, the expenditure of resources is not the same (cMRIMj3 = 3 6= cRIMj = 1).
Thus, to compare RIM with MRPIM, we assume that the budget available in each
MRPIM instance is |K| times the budget used in the corresponding RIM problem.
Figure 7: Probability distributions to compare RIM with MRPIM
Figures 8 and 9 display, for the London and Swain data sets respectively, the
average objective function values for the three probability distributions and different
values of p (chart on the right) and r (chart on the left). As expected, the convex
distribution produces the best solutions for any value of r and p, since with this
distribution the drop of working probability is the greatest for any k. For the London
data set, MRPIM with the linear and concave distributions finds exactly the same
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Figure 8: Objective Value of RIM vs MRPIM with different Probability Distributions
for London
Figure 9: Objective Value of RIM vs MRPIM with different Probability Distributions
for Swain
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Figure 10: Probability distribution used to compare MRPIM with PIM
solutions as RIM (Figure 8), i.e., the resources are not spread out. For the Swain
data set, MRPIM with all three probability distributions produces better results
than RIM (Figure 9). This indicates that MRPIM always finds solutions that are
equal or better than those found by RIM. In other words, the increased flexibility
captured by MRPIM allows the generation of more disruptive attacking strategies.
5.4.2 MRPIM versus PIM
In the PIM model, the facilities can only be attacked with one level of resources, and
each attack has a given probability of success. MRPIM is a more versatile model than
PIM in that it allows the use of different levels of resources to hit each facility and
the probability of success is commensurate with the amount of resources employed
in the attack.
To compare MRPIM and PIM, we use three non-dominated probability distribu-
tions where the values of the probability functions for k = 1 are equal to the proba-
bility used in the PIM model, which we assume to be 0.7. Specifically, the probability
of each facility j working is given by: 1) pjk = ((kmax − k) / (kmax − 1))1/3 ∗0.7 (con-
cave function); 2) pjk = 0.3∗ (3− k)+0.1 (linear function); 3) pjk = 0.7/k1.3 (convex
function), where k = 1, 2, 3. The three functions are shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 11: Objective Value of PIM vs MRPIM with different Probability Distribu-
tions for London
Figure 12: Objective Value of PIM vs MRPIM with different Probability Distribu-
tions for Swain
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Figures 11 and 12 show, for the London and Swain data sets respectively, the
average objective function values obtained with the three probability distributions
for different values of the parameters p (graphs on the right) and r (graphs on the
left). The MRPIM model always outperforms PIM with any probability function in
both the London and Swain data sets. This is due to the greater flexibility of MRPIM
which allows to concentrate more resources on one facility to increase its failure
probability. As expected, the advantage of using MRPIM is more evident when the
concave probability function is used, as in this case the interdiction resources are
more concentrated on a few facilities.
6 Conclusions
Formulating the multi resource interdiction median problem in a computationally
tractable way is a challenge. We have proposed three different ways of representing
this problem mathematically.
We started with a non-linear formulation of the problem and showed how to lin-
earize the resulting model so that it could be solved by commercial MIP solvers. This
model, called MIP-MRPIM, however, only allowed us to solve problem instances of
modest size. We then tried to improve this formulation by representing some prob-
lematic constraints (the ones enforcing closest assignments between customers and
facilities) as a separate optimization problem, thus obtaining a bilevel formulation
(BI-MRPIM). Although more efficient than the previous one, this model still re-
quired a considerable amount of computing time to solve some problem instances
to optimality. Finally, we proposed a less intuitive formulation, based on a network
representation of the problem, which proved to be extremely effective in solving
problems of realistic size.
Overall, we obtained an efficiency improvement of about 76% when going from
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MIP-MRPIM to BI-MRPIM and an additional 99% improvement when going from
BI-MRPIM to NET-MRPIM. This last formulation allowed us to solve difficult prob-
lems, characterized by larger interdiction budgets. All problem instances were solved
to optimality in a few seconds, with the largest instances requiring slightly more than
a minute of computing time.
We provided a sensitivity analysis of the solution times to changes in the problem
parameters, and discussed the robustness of the proposed models to possible mises-
timations of the probability functions which were used to represent the probability
of a facility working probabilities as a function of the amount of resources employed
in the attacks.
Finally, we demonstrated that MRPIM is a sensible extension of some previous
interdiction models proposed in the literature, such as RIM and PIM, as it allows
the identification of more cost effective interdiction strategies.
In the future, we plan to embed this new interdiction model within protection
and design models so as to identify sound protection strategies and reliable system
configurations in the face of malicious attacks.
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